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1. Introduction 
Although many precautionary measures are taken to preclude failures and malfunctions 
from occurring in Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) interplanetary robotic spacecraft before 
launch, unexpected faults and off-nominal conditions do happen in flight. Also, as 
spacecraft age, electrical and mechanical parts are expected to degrade in performance. 
Unlike aircraft vehicles, once robotic spacecraft are launched, they cannot be returned to the 
hangar for repairs. Maintaining the health and functionality of robotic spacecraft, probes, 
rovers, and their compliment of science instruments is an ongoing challenge which must be 
met throughout the lifetime of every mission. When unexpected or anomalous events arise, 
the Spacecraft Operations ground-based Flight Support (SOFS) team of engineers for that 
particular spacecraft must troubleshoot the problem and implement a solution within the 
allowable time constraints. 
 
Fig. 1. JPL’s Galileo Spacecraft: Mission to Jupiter. 
Degradation of spacecraft components can occur from several different sources. Material 
stresses caused by environmental effects such as solar heating or the cold of deep space and 
solar radiation bombardment can contribute to malfunctions in subsystem components. 
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Additionally, autonomously running Flight Software (FSW) sequences and in-flight 
computer coding upgrades periodically sent to the spacecraft can potentially introduce 
human-induced faults. Further, as spacecraft design sophistication and complexity 
increases, failure modes increase in number, and fault diagnosis & resolution becomes a 
more difficult and time-consuming task for the SOFS team to handle. In order to meet 
mission constraints, timely solutions must be implemented for handling the task of 
collecting large volumes of telemetered data from the spacecraft which are compared with 
archived historical data & spacecraft design information to determine failure causes and 
implement fault resolution actions. Additionally, interplanetary spacecraft missions that 
experience large Earth-spacecraft distances (such as exploration missions to the outer 
planets of our solar system), present an additional challenge since the ever-increasing time 
delay between commands sent by the SOFS team and return telemetry received by the 
spacecraft limits the ability to respond to failure occurrences in a timely manner. This Round  
 
 
Fig. 2. JPL’s Cassini Spacecraft: Mission to Saturn. 
 
 
Fig. 3. JPL’s Voyager Spacecraft: Interstellar Mission. 
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Trip Light (and radio) Time (RTLT) delay between ground commanding and spacecraft data 
delivery back to the SOFS team is especially of concern when critical “one-chance mission 
events” must take place at a specific time (such as deploying a probe while flying by a 
planet’s moon), or when serious, potentially mission-catastrophic failures occur so quickly 
that they must be fixed immediately.  
To protect robotic spacecraft from these types of hazards and limitations, mission robustness 
is enhanced by implementing several strategies to provide a spacecraft system with greater 
integrity and diagnostic capability. This system health management approach is employed 
by several means: implementing “flight rules” and mission design constraints, applying 
functional redundancy through FSW, adding redundant hardware, and applying Fault 
Protection (FP) techniques which consist of automated response routines containing 
preprogrammed instructions to respond to failure conditions. This FP strategy involves 
autonomous monitoring of component operation to ensure device health, evaluation of 
internal and external conditions, and monitoring power allocation to spacecraft devices. In 
general, most JPL robotic spacecraft require some unique mission specific FP, but the 
majority of spacecraft configurations contain FP algorithms which protect the command and 
data processing capabilities, maintaining attitude control of the vehicle, protection against 
Earth-communication loss with the spacecraft, ensuring that safe external and internal 
temperature levels are maintained, and recovery from power overloads or power loss. To 
accommodate the majority of anticipated faults, most spacecraft are equipped with a 
general-purpose “Safe-Mode response routine” that configures the spacecraft to a reduced 
power state that is power-positive, thermally stable, in a communicative state, with a known 
predictable spacecraft configuration so that diagnosis of more complex faults can be 
addressed by the SOFS Team. Optimization of spacecraft post-fault recovery time is 
achieved through the development of automated tools and pre-determined “recovery 
procedures” which contain pre-defined actions for the SOFS team to follow which greatly 
reduces post-fault recovery time.  
This chapter details the challenges and difficulties encountered by several JPL 
interplanetary spacecraft missions during the course of their mission flight phases and 
describes the solutions and workarounds implemented by their supporting SOFS ground 
teams to protect their mission objectives.  
2. Background: Health & safety concerns and preventative measures 
Once JPL spacecraft are ferried out of Earth's gravity well, usually by multi-stage rocket, it 
will either enter Earth’s orbit or proceed directly out into deep space.  Through the use of 
NASA’s Deep Space Network (DSN) radio telescope system, the spacecraft’s SOFS team of 
engineers will stay in contact with the vehicle, providing instructions through “uplinked” 
commands while the spacecraft’s “downlink” telemetry stream of data provides detailed 
information of all it encounters throughout its mission lifetime. Upon the deployment, 
configuration, and verification of all its systems following launch, the propulsion system 
will be utilized to target the spacecraft to the intended destination through its trajectory. 
JPL’s interplanetary spacecraft mission objectives typically consist of orbiting or flying by an 
object, moon, or planet, or landing the spacecraft or its probe on a target object. The suite of 
scientific instruments carried onboard the spacecraft will perform many scientific tasks 
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throughout the lifetime of the mission. As spacecraft journey through the vastness of space, 
many factors will provide a challenge in maintaining spacecraft health and functionality. All 
of these risk factors must be taken into account when designing JPL spacecraft, even those 
influences and events which may be unforeseen. 
In order for spacecraft systems to function properly, both external and internal temperatures 
must be monitored, regulated, and controlled during the entire lifetime of the spacecraft’s 
mission. Exposure to the sun’s heat is one of the most detrimental external influences on 
spacecraft operation in the vacuum of space if the vehicle flies in close proximity to this 
celestial body. The spacecraft’s surfaces can superheat when exposed to the sun, while 
shadowed surfaces can fall to extremely low temperatures. Material stress can result from 
this thermal expansion-contraction effect, leading to uneven heating. This uneven heating 
can lead to warpage, breakage of components, or camera distortion. To help alleviate some 
of these problems, spacecraft are equipped with fault-preventative devices such as optical 
solar reflectors, mirror tiles, or multi-layer insulation thermal blankets which will reflect the 
sun’s heat and radiation so that the spacecraft is somewhat protected against overheating, 
while retaining its internal heat to prevent too much cooling. Adverse thermal 
environmental conditions must be avoided since computers and spacecraft components will 
cease to work if spacecraft temperatures become too extreme (Qualitative Reasoning Group, 
2005). Additional precautions must also be taken to ensure that instruments do not fall out 
of operating limits, since many devices are designed to operate within a narrow range of 
temperatures. Also important is the spacecraft’s interior environment which must be 
properly managed as well, since heat build-up can occur from the spacecraft's own systems. 
One method employed to regulate internal temperatures is circulating the spacecraft’s own 
gas or liquids (fuel) to cool its interior. Equally important is the thermal state of these 
substances since they must be maintained to ensure that they do not freeze from deep space 
exposure. This condition would render the propellant unusable so that the spacecraft would 
not be able to maneuver, eventually becoming misaligned with Earth so that no signals 
could be sent or received by the spacecraft.  
Although precautionary measures are taken to preclude the possibility of human-induced 
electro-static discharge events (static electricity discharge) within spacecraft components 
during the manufacturing process, “latent failures” can occur after launch, rendering the 
device useless or partially useless. Additionally, human error can also be introduced within 
command sequences which are continuously generated and sent to the spacecraft. These 
sequences contain instructions for controlling the spacecraft's activities such as tracking 
Earth, monitoring celestial references for attitude targeting, performing maneuvers to fine-
tune the trajectory when required, and carrying out science calibration and operations. 
These command sequences are all subject to human error which can potentially cause 
serious faults. One example would be accidentally turning off a radio transmitter or receiver 
device onboard the spacecraft, thus preventing communication with earth. Another fault 
could be turning on too many spacecraft instruments and components at the same time so 
that the spacecraft’s power source (solar panels, Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators 
(RTGs), fuel cells, etc.) are unable to provide the power required to support all operating 
systems.  This condition is referred to as a “spacecraft-wide under-voltage power-outage” in 
which loss of power to critical devices can occur, such as the computers which must 
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maintain their power levels to retain computer memory. Automated FP routines are 
implemented to resolve this type of condition, which is further detailed in an example 
covered later in this chapter. 
Although radio waves travel at the speed of light, making spacecraft-earth transactions 
almost instantaneous near earth, as the distance between earth and the spacecraft increases, 
even a signal traveling at the speed of light can take hours. This lag time becomes a high-
risk deterrent to fault recovery when spacecraft are sent out great distances like the Galileo, 
Cassini, and Voyager missions. Under some anomalous conditions, it is impossible for 
spacecraft to respond to ground commands quickly enough to preclude a catastrophic 
failure from occurring. An example would be the failure of a latch valve to close properly in 
the propulsion maneuvering system after re-pressurization of the spacecraft’s fuel tanks has 
commenced. This type of fault can cause the tank pressure to rise substantially in a very 
short amount of time. If this condition were to occur on the Cassini spacecraft (Mission-to-
Saturn) where the RTLT is approximately 3 hours, the pressure level could potentially reach 
a catastrophic point before the pressure measurement data could even reach earth to 
indicate that the fault condition has occurred, since Cassini’s telemetry stream takes well 
over an hour to reach SOFS personnel from its Saturn-Titan orbit position. This “lag time” 
problem especially becomes a concern for spacecraft missions that contain one-time 
opportunities such as planet/moon encounters. For these events, the timing is crucial since 
only one opportunity exists to meet the objective and there may be no second chance. These 
unique events must proceed without the threat of fault interference in order for the 
spacecraft’s mission to be successful (Morgan, 2011).   
Another concern for spacecraft systems is Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) between 
components. When designing spacecraft subsystems, Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) 
effects must be minimized so that the spacecraft’s systems function properly within their 
intended operational environment, without adversely affecting or being adversely 
effected by other spacecraft components. Spacecraft subsystems can become ineffective or 
malfunction if neighboring devices are not designed to minimize their EMI effects when 
operating simultaneously. To ensure component compatibility, EMI assessment and 
testing are required pre-launch to avoid undesirable electromagnetic fields, conducted 
voltages, and currents. As an example, the Cassini mission implemented a study to 
preclude EMI effects from other subsystem devices on the Duel Technique Magnetometer 
(MAG) science instrument. The MAG device consists of two instruments which have been 
mounted along an 11-meter boom apparatus to minimize spacecraft component EMI 
effects. During the early project phase, several engineering components and science 
instruments were identified to be potential magnetic interference sources (e.g. Traveling 
Wave Tube Amplifiers (TWTA), Propulsion Module Subsystem (PMS) multiple latch 
valves, Power & Pyro Subsystem (PPS) latch relays, etc.). Pre-launch preliminary 
assessments indicated that the permanent magnets contained in these subsystem devices 
had the potential to impact the upcoming MAG science experiments. A Magnetics Control 
Review Board (MCRB) was established to address EMC issues to ensure that magnetic 
cleanliness was maintained between devices (Narvaez, 2002). Participants representing 
these subsystem devices discussed precautionary measures such as shielding methods, 
implementation of magnetic compensation, wiring layouts to minimize loop areas, and 
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replacing magnetic materials with non-magnetic materials. This effort led to the 
establishment of requirements and guidelines to assist hardware designers in developing 
EMC strategies which would produce minimal magnetic field output. The MCRB 
committee stressed implementing these fixes as early as possible in the design phase to 
allow for flexibility in the available solutions. Amongst the fixes implemented on behalf of 
the MAG instrument EMI reduction effort were: 1) both TWTAs were packed side-by-side 
within their housing so that their respective magnetic field polarities would be configured 
in opposing directions, 2) the PPS subsystem arranged all magnetic latch relays to occur in 
pairs, with their respective magnetic poles opposite to each other (provides self-
cancelation; for odd number relays, a small compensation magnet was installed to 
neutralize the field), 3) a theoretical model was produced for the four RTGs which 
provided optimum compensation for the selected arrangement of clocking angles. For 
those subsystems which could not reduce their EMI effects or replace high magnetic 
materials with non-magnetic materials, magnetic compensation was implemented. The 
most significant magnetic compensation was installed into the PMS latch valve 
components. In this case, each latch valve was measured and magnetically compensated 
with magnets which contained the same dipole moment (opposing). Following these EMI 
reduction applications, each one of Cassini’s components was tested in order to verify its 
respective magnetic cleanliness for the overall system, prior to its final installation on the 
spacecraft. 
In addition to the above challenges, many spacecraft designs have become more complex 
throughout the last several years. As a result, fault diagnosis and resolution becomes a more 
difficult and time-consuming task to undertake since fault causes can lead to a plethora of 
possibilities for these very complicated systems. This poses a substantial challenge for the 
SOFS Team whose task it is to collect large volumes of telemetry data needed to diagnose 
faults and propose resolution actions. This can be an arduous, time consuming manual 
process, sometimes requiring hundreds of data products from the spacecraft’s telemetry 
stream to be compared to archived historical data, as well as design information in order to 
evaluate the problem to propose a solution. To aid the fault diagnosis and solution process, 
automated FP routines are typically implemented into the spacecraft’s FSW to deal with the 
majority of possible failure conditions; this FP is designed to protect for any Single Point 
Failure (SPF) conditions that might arise (unless proven extremely unlikely; waiver issued), 
with the following priorities in mind: 
1. Protect critical spacecraft functionality 
2. Protect spacecraft performance and consumables 
3. Minimize disruptions to normal sequence operations 
4. Simplify SOFS recovery response  
These FP groundrules are typically implemented with the following principle in mind, 
following any anomaly: Ensure the spacecraft’s commandability remains intact as well as 
the maintenance of its systems; to remain in a stable, safe state for a pre-determined period 
of time following any anomaly (e.g. for the Cassini spacecraft, this period is two weeks, by 
which time the SOFS team should be able to recover the spacecraft and restart its onboard 
sequence). Sections 3.2.1 & 3.2.2 detail two examples of FP implementation from the Cassini 
mission.  
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3. FP groundrules for JPL spacecraft 
Each JPL spacecraft is unique in its configuration and mission objectives and the task of 
implementing autonomous FP must be considered carefully according to its configuration, 
expected environment, component design, and its operational tasks, although some FP is 
approached in a generic manner. In general, autonomous fault protection should only be 
implemented on-board the spacecraft for those fault conditions where a ground response is 
not feasible or practical, or if fault resolution action is required within a pre-defined period 
of time of detecting the failure. Otherwise, the ground system should have adequate time to 
respond to the fault and should be responsible for the fault recovery. In both cases, the 
ground is responsible for failure diagnosis and re-configuration of the spacecraft to nominal 
operations after the fault. Some spacecraft designs may be quite simple (e.g. lack propulsion 
and attitude control subsystems entirely, such as an atmospheric probe), and some 
spacecraft are quite complex, but many spacecraft share common systems which require a 
similar approach in FP design (Morgan, 2005). 
3.1 Fault protection typically implemented into JPL spacecraft 
Some spacecraft have design configurations simple enough to warrant only minimal fault 
protection which is meant to address any type of fault condition that might occur, yet other 
spacecraft designs are so complex and sophisticated, with long mission durations, that they 
must maintain a system which may present numerous error possibilities. Most spacecraft 
typically rely on a "general-purpose, Safe-Mode” fault response which typically configures 
the spacecraft to a lower power state by turning off all nonessential spacecraft loads, 
commanding a thermally safe attitude, providing a safe state for the hardware, establishing 
an uplink and a downlink, reconfiguring to a low-gain antenna, and terminating the 
command sequence currently executing on the spacecraft. This type of response is used to 
configure the spacecraft into safe and predictable state so that the SOFS team has enough 
time to evaluate the fault causes and determine a solution.  
FP typically implemented into JPL spacecraft designs also includes an automated response 
to address “loss of spacecraft signal” faults that affect the SOFS team’s ability to 
communicate with the spacecraft. Failure to receive the spacecraft’s uplink signal can be 
caused by a number of problems which include ground antenna failures, environmental 
interferences, spacecraft hardware failures, as well as an erroneous spacecraft attitude 
(pointing error), radio frequency interferences, or an error introduced in an uplinked 
sequence (e.g. radio transmitter device accidentally turned off). If the spacecraft has 
experienced these types of failures and is no longer able to receive commands from the 
ground, a FP response can be implemented to help re-establish the uplink. This type of FP is 
referred to as a “Command Loss Response” (from the perspective of the spacecraft, that it is 
no longer receiving ground commands) which is typically an “endless-loop” response (see 
Section 3.2.1). 
Another FP algorithm typically installed into spacecraft is for recovery from a system-wide 
loss of power. This is referred to as “Under-Voltage” recovery, and can be caused by a 
number of fault conditions depending on the spacecraft design (i.e. oversubscribing the 
power available, a short in the power system, or a communications bus overload). Should a 
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system-wide power loss occur, not even the Safe-Mode response will execute since the main 
computer will also lose power thus causing loss of the mission. Therefore, FP must be 
implemented to detect the power level drop so that the system may automatically shed its 
non-essential loads from the communications bus, isolate the defective device, and re-
establish essential hardware. The quick actions of this response allow critical spacecraft 
memories to be maintained throughout the Under-Voltage event (see Section 3.2.2).   
FP monitors detect anomalous conditions using predefined “trigger values” which are 
referred to as “thresholds” or “redlines,” that represent the value at which an anomalous 
condition is present. The monitor design may also include logic which detects for, and 
ignores data from failed sensors. “Consecutive occurrence counters” are also used in some 
FP monitors; these are referred to as “persistence filters” and are implemented for a variety 
of reasons: to ensure that transient occurrences do not trigger a response, to satisfy 
hardware turn-on constraints, or to allow other FP monitors to detect faults first.  SOFS 
personnel can also enable or disable the spacecraft’s monitors and responses during the 
mission as appropriate. This is accomplished through a FSW flag which may be 
manipulated by the team. For the most part, the FP is designed assuming that these flags 
will be enabled throughout the mission; however, some exceptions to this strategy exist:  
 The response is only appropriate when the associated device is powered on & operating 
 The response is required only for specific mission events  
 The response is not appropriate for a particular event  
 The response is not compatible with the currently operating sequence 
Figures (4a) through (4d) depict four JPL spacecraft designs with quite different mission 
objectives, which employ typical and mission unique FP (Ball Corp., 2001; JPL, 1997, 
2005). 
 
CloudSat: Earth Orbiting Satellite  
Standard FP: 3 Safe-Mode Responses 
         5 Under-voltage Responses 
           Memory Scrubber & Bus FP 
Unique FP: Significant computer & thermal
FP 
Stardust Spacecraft: Inner Solar System; 
Comet Explorer 
Standard FP: 1 Safe-Mode Response 
                      1 Under-voltage Response 
                      1 Command Loss Response 
                      Memory Scrubber & Bus FP 
Unique FP: Some computer & thermal FP 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. (4a). CloudSat Spacecraft FP Allocation. Fig. (4b). Stardust Spacecraft FP Allocation. 
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Cassini Spacecraft: Outer Solar System Explorer
Standard FP: 1 Safe-Mode Response 
                       1 Post-Safe Mode Response 
                       1 Under-voltage Response 
                       1 Command Loss Response 
                       Memory Scrubber & Bus FP 
Unique FP: Significant command & data 
processing computer FP, radio unit FP, 
thermal FP, fuel tank pressure FP, attitude 
articulation and control computer FP 
 
Voyager  Spacecraft: Interstellar Explorer 
Standard FP: 1 Under-voltage Response 
                       1 Command Loss Response 
Unique FP: Computer FP, attitude 
articulation and control computer FP, and 
radio unit FP 
 
 
 
 
Fig. (4c). Cassini Spacecraft FP Allocation. Fig. (4d). Voyager Spacecraft FP Allocation. 
3.2 FP examples from the Cassini-Huygens mission-to-Saturn spacecraft 
The Cassini–Huygens spacecraft is a joint NASA/ESA/ASI mission to the Saturnian system 
sent to study the planet and its many natural satellites. The craft was launched from Cape 
Canaveral on October 15, 1997 following nearly two decades of development. It is 
comprised of a Saturn orbiter (shown in Figure 2) and an atmospheric probe/lander to 
investigate the moon Titan. The Cassini spacecraft has also returned data on a wide variety 
of tasks including assessment of the heliosphere, planet Jupiter, and has conducted relativity 
tests. During the early part of its seven-year cruise phase, Cassini’s trajectory was fine-tuned 
by performing “gravity-assist flyby” maneuvers which utilized the inner planets of the solar 
system. Two of these gravity assist flybys were implemented around Venus (April 26, 1998 
& June 21, 1999), one around Earth (August 18, 1999), and one around Jupiter (December 30, 
2000) as shown in Figure 5. With the use of this VVEJGA (Venus-Venus-Earth-Jupiter 
Gravity Assist) trajectory, it took 6.7 years for the Cassini spacecraft to arrive at Saturn in 
July 2004.  
During the 6.7 year cruise phase, several Trajectory Control Maneuvers (TCM) were 
performed using Cassini’s Main Engine (ME) and Reaction Control System (RCS) jets to 
guide the Spacecraft to its intended destination. Once near the Saturnian system, the “Saturn 
Orbit Insertion (SOI)” burn maneuver was implemented to slow the craft down so that it 
could be captured into Saturn’s orbit. This marked the beginning of its four-year Orbital 
Tour phase around Saturn’s complex system of moons which is shown in Figure 6. The 
probe was separated on Christmas Eve 2004, landing on the Titan moon in January 2005. 
The current end-of-mission plan is for a controlled 2017 Saturn impact (Smith & TPS, 2009). 
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Fig. 5. Cassini’s Inner Planet Flyby Schedule. 
 
Fig. 6. Cassini’s Prime Mission, Extended Mission (XM), and Extended-Extended (XXM) 
Mission. 
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3.2.1 Cassini’s command loss algorithm 
Figure 7 illustrates how the Cassini Spacecraft’s Command Loss FP Algorithm addresses 
faults that can cause ground-spacecraft communications loss; this condition is referred to as 
“loss of spacecraft commandability.” A special “countdown timer” has been implemented 
into the onboard CDS FSW to keep track of the last time an uplink command was received 
from the ground operators. This timer decrements continuously (at one second intervals) 
and is reset back to its “default value” (several days for Cassini) each time an uplink 
command is received by the spacecraft. The extended absence of uplink commands will 
eventually lead to the monitor’s request for the response, since the timer will eventually 
decrement to “0”.  Under these conditions, the assumption is that the spacecraft has 
experienced a failure where it can no longer receive commands. 
 
Fig. 7. Cassini’s Command Loss Response Chain for One CDS Cycle (Endless Loop Response). 
Cassini contains redundant units for the Command & Data Computer (CDS), Radio 
Frequency (RFS) devices, (Deep Space Transponders, TWTAs, Telemetry Control Units 
(TCU)), as well as three antennas (one High Gain Antenna (HGA) and two Low Gain 
Antennas (LGA)). The Command Loss Response is divided up into “Command Groups” 
with “Command Pauses” installed after each group of commands has been executed.  These 
pauses allow several hours (the equivalent of at least two RTLT periods) for the SOFS team 
to attempt re-acquisition of the spacecraft using the newly response-commanded spacecraft 
configuration. As shown in the figure, the first Command Group will select the auxiliary 
oscillator and execute the Safe-Mode response which turns off non-essential loads, 
commands the spacecraft’s High Gain Antenna to the Sun, and places the spacecraft in a 
known uplink & downlink state. A 15 hour wait period has been installed after this first 
Command Group to allow sufficient time for the SOFS team to re-establish the uplink, if 
possible, before hardware swaps begin. If this attempt is unsuccessful, the response will 
proceed with the next course of actions in Command Group #2 which is to start the series of 
RFS hardware unit swaps. Five to seven hour wait periods are installed between each 
subsequent Command Group to allow the SOFS team adequate time to send commands to 
the spacecraft to re-establish the uplink on the new commanded configuration. At the end of 
the response chain (approx. 5 days 20 hrs), a swap to the redundant CDS is initiated and the 
www.intechopen.com
 
Advances in Spacecraft Systems and Orbit Determination 246 
response will activate on the other computer’s FSW (the response runs endlessly until an 
uplink command is received by the ground). The goal of Command Loss FP is to perform 
hardware swaps and/or re-command the S/C attitude until the ground acquisition is 
restored. Once the spacecraft successfully receives a command from the ground and the 
uplink has been re-established, the response will terminate and reset its countdown timer, 
thus leaving the spacecraft on the last successfully commanded configuration. 
3.2.2 Cassini’s under-voltage trip algorithm 
Cassini’s “Under-voltage Trip” monitor and response are shown in Figure 8, “Cassini 
Spacecraft’s Under Voltage FP Actions for Shorted RTG” in which a RTG power unit (one of 
three on this spacecraft), has shorted. In this example, the Power Subsystem FP senses a 
power drop below the predefined threshold for the duration of the persistence filter. The  
 
 
 
Fig. 8. Cassini’s Under Voltage Fault Protection Actions for a Shorted RTG. 
RFS - Radio Frequency Subsystem 
PPS - Power & Pyrotechnics Subsystem 
CDS - Command & Data processing Subsystem 
          (Main Computer)  
SFP - System level Fault Protection 
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first action taken by the Power Subsystem FP is to diode-isolate all three RTGs, turn off 
(loadshed) all spacecraft non-essential loads, regain the voltage regulation to 30 watts, and 
then turn on all essential hardware. It also sets three “UV Status Flags” (one for each RTG) 
to notify System-level FP (SFP) that an Under-Voltage trip event has occurred. Once the 
CDS becomes operational, it will deliver these UV Status Flags to SFP.  SFP’s Under Voltage 
monitor will examine the state of each RTG and if enabled, will request the Under Voltage 
response. The SFP response un-isolates any correctly operating RTG, unsets its 
corresponding UV Status Flag, and establishes a predictable, safe spacecraft state by 
executing the Safe-Mode response. 
3.3 Cassini safing response activations to date 
On the Cassini project, is the responsibility of the SOFS ground team to support spacecraft 
activities via the established Mission Plan, to follow established constraints, flight rules, 
agreed upon waivers, and requirements documentation in order to support the following 
activities: 
 Real-time & near real-time monitoring of subsystem performance  
 Ensure subsystem health and safety of all subsystems is maintained 
 Develop onboard Spacecraft Sequences (8 – 10 wk segments for Cassini) 
 Develop & support ME & RCS maneuvers 
 Support science activities (data collection) 
as well as designing and uplinking required FSW updates which are needed to meet 
ongoing mission goals and upcoming events. SOFS tasks also include FSW parameter 
upgrades, producing Engineering Change Requests (ECR) to implement FSW changes, 
validation & verification testing, command & uplink strategy of activities, and 
development of “instructional procedures” for initiating coordinated spacecraft activities 
between SOFS team members. On Cassini, anomaly resolution is initiated through 
“recovery procedures” when FP activates, which consists of steps to verify the state of the 
spacecraft through its telemetry stream, determine the FP that activated, and coordination 
of recovery steps between team experts (representing RFS, PPS, CDS, SFP etc.) in order to 
determine the fault cause and resolve the problem as well as reactivating the spacecraft’s 
onboard sequence. To date, 6 activations of the Safing Response (and ‘parent’ FP routines) 
have been triggered:  
1. 1998 Mar24 – Fault Cause: When the redundant Stellar Reference Unit (SRU) was 
turned on, it was misaligned with its counterpart SRU  
Diagnosis: This was an unforeseen incident which cannot be modeled in Cassini test 
facility 
FP Activated: Spacecraft Safing Response 
2. 1999 Jan11 – Fault Cause: An overly sensitive attitude control target parameter was 
implemented in FSW 
Diagnosis: Only flight experience can reveal this problem 
FP Activated: Spacecraft Safing Response 
3. 2001 May10 – Fault Cause: The onboard sequence was missing a telemetry mode in the 
redundant CDS unit which caused the counterpart CDS to Reset 
Diagnosis: Operator error 
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FP Activated: Internal CDS FP + Spacecraft Safing Response 
4. 2003 May12 – Fault Cause: Missing attitude control pointing vector in onboard 
sequence 
Diagnosis: Operator error 
FP Activated: Spacecraft Safing Response 
5. 2007 Sept11 – Fault Cause: Cosmic ray hit the spacecraft (referred to as Single Event 
Upset (SEU)) which caused the TWTA to turn off 
Diagnosis: Due to environmental effects 
FP Activated: 3 response cycles of TWTA FP + Spacecraft Safing Response (TWTA swap 
to redundant unit) 
6. 2010 Nov02 – Fault Cause: Cosmic ray hit an uplinked command which caused the CDS 
to swap to its redundant unit 
Diagnosis: Due to environmental effects 
FP Activated: Internal CDS FP + Spacecraft Safing Response  
As stated previously, the Safing Response (and internal FP routines) provide a safe 
spacecraft state with low uplink & downlink rates for the SOFS team to diagnose the fault 
condition, recover the spacecraft systems, and reactive the onboard sequence. Two weeks 
was originally allocated for this recovery period. But once the Cassini spacecraft reached the 
Saturnian system and began its mission Tour phase in 2004, three Orbital Trim Maneuvers 
(OTMs) were now required for each loop around Saturn-Titan, making the two-week-
turnaround period infeasible since a lengthy spacecraft recovery period could cause Cassini 
to fall off the Tour trajectory. A High Gain Antenna Swap (HAS) Response was therefore 
designed into the FSW to help the SOFS team improve recovery time. This HAS response 
executes one hour after the Safing Response activation to increase the downlink rate from 
5bps (bits per second) => 1896bps, and the uplink rate from 7.8125bps => 250bps. Figure 9 
shows the HAS Response following the Safing Response activation.  
 
 
Fig. 9. New HGA Response was added in 2003; Configured to Run 1 hr. after Safing Response 
Executes. 
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4. Examples of unforeseen, unplanned for spacecraft problems & SOFS team 
solutions   
Not all spacecraft faults will activate the Safing Response and terminate the onboard 
command sequence. Some faults are benign enough to allow the sequence to remain in 
progress since the FP can fix the conditions without intervention from the SOFS team. 
However, some fault conditions are unforeseen prelaunch, presenting themselves as a new 
challenge for the SOFS to resolve during the actual flight phase. This section lists a few 
examples of unexpected faults that have occurred on several JPL spacecraft, without the 
benefit of preventative FSW, FP, or redundancy to fix the problem. In spite of this fact, all 
SOFS teams realized that in any spacecraft mission there is always the possibility that new 
problems can arise due to unknown environmental effects, human errors, or 
component/science instrument aging. 
4.1 Unexpected events for the Cassini-Huygens spacecraft encountered during flight 
4.1.1 Environmental errors 
4.1.1.1 Solid state power switch SEUs 
The Cassini spacecraft consists of 192 SSPS switches which are susceptible to SEUs, caused 
by galactic rays within the flight environment. One or more photon hits can occur on the 
voltage comparator resulting in a false indication that the current load is anomalously high. 
When this condition occurs, the SSPS switch transitions from either an “on” or “off” state to 
“tripped.” The result of this condition can be benign to serious, depending on which switch 
is tripped, and if it is in use at the time. In May 2005, a SSPS trip event on the spacecraft’s 
ultra stable oscillator caused the SOFS ground team to lose communication with the 
spacecraft for a short period of time. In September 2007, the TWTA device tripped which 
activated a FP response, thus causing a Power-On-Reset of the RFS system, and hardware 
swaps to the redundant Telemetry Control Unit and TWTA device; the Safing Response was 
also activated (see Section 3.3). Although nothing can be done to reduce or inhibit the 
occurrence of SEU induced SSPS trips (which are unpredictable and occur sporadically), the 
SOFS team designed a new algorithm in CDS FSW to respond to these upset events. This 
new “SSPS Fault Protection” algorithm cycles through one SSPS per second (of 192 switches) 
and responds to the tripped condition if three consecutive passes through the monitor logic 
determines that a tripped switch condition is present. A series of predetermined actions 
have been coded into FSW to respond to the “tripped” condition for each switch, depending 
on the appropriate action for that load. An example is shown below for the CAssini Plasma  
 
 
Table 1. SSPS FP for CAssini Plasma Spectrometer (CAPS) Instrument. 
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Spectrometer (CAPS) Instrument where if its electrical load current is tripped, the FP will 
log the event, command the switch “off”, and then command its CAPS Replacement Heater 
Load Current (CAPS_RHtr_LC) “on” to protect the thermal integrity of the device: 
As of this the date of this writing, there have been 33 SSPS trip events (25 during the prime 
mission). 
4.1.1.2 Main Engine Assembly (MEA) cover degradation 
Cassini’s ME assembly requires a cover which must be deployed (closed) when the engines 
require protection from micrometeoroid and on-orbit dust impacts which often surrounds 
Saturn and its moons. Shortly before the Deep Space Maneuver (DSM) burn when the MEA 
cover was stowed (opened), the cover assembly did not open as far as was observed in 
ground tests. The cover opened 14 degrees less than expected, but the SOFS team 
demonstrated that this opening angle was adequate to allow for successful main engine 
burns to commence (on either nozzle). The cause of this degradation in performance of the 
MEA cover was attributed to the increased stiffness in the cover material (kapton & beta 
cloth) due to exposure to the space environment which was experienced during flight 
within the inner solar system, although a period of disuse also contributed to this increased 
stiffness. These environmental effects cannot be adequately modeled in ground tests. The 
SOFS team’s ongoing response to this unexpected behavior of the cover actuation was to 
monitor its behavior closely (along with device experts) with results to date demonstrating 
that the opening angle has remained acceptable through several dozen cycles, with no 
further signs of degradation observed as depicted above (Figure 10). As of the date of this 
writing, 66 in-flight cycles have now been performed (Millard & Somawardhana, 2009). 
 
Fig. 10. Main Engine Assembly (MEA) Cover Stow (Open) History ~ Position vs. Mission Time. 
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TCM-6
TCM-17 TCM-18 TCM-19
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www.intechopen.com
 
Resolving the Difficulties Encountered by JPL Interplanetary Robotic Spacecraft in Flight 251 
4.1.2 Human induced errors 
4.1.2.1 Probe transmission design error during Titan moon encounter 
The European Space Agency’s (ESA) Huygens Probe was piggybacked aboard the Cassini 
orbiter to capture data from Titan’s atmosphere and measure wind effects and surface 
features once deployed onto this moon. Return of the probe’s data was a key element to 
the success of the joint Cassini-Huygens mission. Since the Huygens Probe had minimal 
onboard data storage capability, data was to be transmitted to the Cassini orbiter 
immediately during the Entry, Descent, and Landing (EDL) phase of the probe mission so 
that the orbiter itself provided the bulk data storage that was needed. To prepare for the 
probe deployment and relay of its Titan data back to earth, which was to commence in 
January 2005, end-to-end in-flight tests of the Probe Relay link were performed in 
February 2000. This was necessary in order to characterize the behavior of the combined 
Cassini-Huygens system, where the real probe signal was simulated in-flight from the 
DSN to the spacecraft. During these tests, the signal and data detection thresholds of the 
receiver were of particular interest. Results confirmed that there was sufficient margin to 
maintain the carrier and subcarrier lock for the duration of the probe mission, but the 
digital circuitry which decodes the data from the subcarrier did not have sufficient 
bandwidth to properly process the data from the subcarrier once it was Doppler shifted 
by the nominal 5.6 km/s velocity difference between the orbiter and the probe. Since the 
digital circuit design did not adequately account for the probe data’s full Doppler shift, 
the affect of this anomaly was that it would lead to an unacceptable loss of data during 
the probe descent to Titan phase. This lead to the formulation of the Huygens Recovery 
Task Force (HRTF) team, a joint effort between ESA/NASA group of experts to 
troubleshoot the problem in January 2001. Their efforts led to a three-part solution which 
allowed recovery of the Titan data. 
Firstly, the mission profile was redesigned to provide the Huygens Probe with a trajectory 
which allowed a low Doppler shift in the probe-Cassini orbiter radio link. This impacted 
the early part of the Saturn Tour phase resulting in a higher Cassini orbiter flyby altitude 
of Titan, at 60,000 km, which required redesigning the first two revolutions around Saturn 
into three revolutions, and then resuming the original planned tour (at a moderate ΔV 
cost). Second, the Probe Support Avionics assembly was to be commanded to the base 
frequency (called BITE Mode – a test mode that holds the lockup frequency at a level 
equivalent to -1m/s relative velocity) by the Cassini orbiter, instead of utilizing the signal 
at the expected Doppler frequency. This mode of operation was commanded at 12sec 
intervals (issued by FP; a reserve FP algorithm slot in FSW was utilized to aid in this 
solution), to ensure that BITE Mode was maintained. Thirdly, the probe’s transmitters 
were pre-heated before probe descent into Titan’s atmosphere to optimize the transmit 
frequency.  
The Huygens Probe mission was very successful, with the exception of one (of two) data 
transmission channel to the orbiter which was not received and recorded (human error). 
Since all instrument data was duplicated between the two data channel streams, most data 
was collected with the exception of the Doppler Wind Experiment which relied upon receipt 
of both channels (Allestad & Standley, 2006.). 
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4.1.2.2 Imaging Science Subsystem (ISS) haze anomaly 
The ISS instrument is a remote sensing device that captures most images in visible light, as 
well as some infrared and ultraviolet images. By radio telemetry the ISS has returned 
hundreds of thousands of images of Saturn, its rings, and its moons. The ISS device consists 
of a Wide-Angle Camera (WAC) to photograph large areas, and a Narrow-Angle Camera 
(NAC) for areas of fine detail. Each of these cameras utilizes a sensitive Charge-Coupled 
Device (CCD) as its electromagnetic wave detector, with each CCD having a 1,024 square 
array of pixels. Both WAC & NAC cameras are configured with spectral filters that rotate on 
a wheel in order to view different bands within the electromagnetic spectrum ranging from 
0.2 to 1.1 μm. 
In 2001 (five months after the Jupiter flyby), a distinct haze was observed around Saturn 
images that were captured by the NAC which had not been seen in previous images. 
Further analysis of these images indicated that this anomaly was caused by contamination 
of extremely small particles which resided either upon the filter assembly or the CCD 
window. The investigation pointed to a decontamination cycle that was performed on May 
25, 2001, thirteen months after the previous decontamination cycle which occurred prior to 
the Jupiter flyby. This indicated that there had been a longer than usual time period for 
contamination to build up. Additionally, this decontamination cycle had started from a 
temperature of -90 deg C, whereas all previous cycles had started at 0 deg C. This meant that 
the Periodic Instrument Maintenance (PIM) had a temperature swing of 120 degrees instead 
of 30 degrees. A series of decontamination cycles commenced, ranging from seven to fifty-
seven days in length. In July 2002, after the final cycle, the haze was no longer present in the 
images. A new flight rule was instated to prohibit the use of the Level 1 and Level 2 heaters 
at the same time which prevented heating to 30 deg C and experiencing a large temperature 
swing such as this event which cause the anomaly (Haemmerle & Gerhard, Undated). 
4.1.3 Occurrence of waived failure in flight: Leaking prime PMS regulator 
One month after Cassini launched (Nov. 1997), a waived, potentially mission catastrophic 
Single Point Failure (SPF) occurred in flight. FP design typically dictates that no credible SPF 
shall prevent attainment of mission objectives or result in a significantly degraded mission, 
with the exception of the class of faults exempted by waiver due to low probability of 
occurrence. In this case, a pre-launch waived failure of the Prime Regulator within the PMS 
failed to properly close. In fact, the regulator exhibited a significant leak rate when the fuel 
& oxidizer tanks were pressurized for the first time during the Trajectory Correction 
Maneuver #1 (TCM-1). The leak rate was determined to be 1700 cc/min compared to the 
expected 1.70 cc/min “worst case leak rate” which was observed in testing. It was 
determined that the first pyro valve firing prior to TCM-1 event was the cause of this high 
leak rate, due to a stuck particle in the regulator (from pyro firing debris). The subsequent 
90 min DSM burn (initiated at launch +14 months) exhibited an even higher leak rate at an 
increase of 6.6 times larger than TCM-1. This behavior suggested that an even larger particle 
had become trapped in the regulator. With this anomaly in place (which was not 
correctable), all non-critical ME burns to commence during the mission were affected, as 
well as the critical Saturn Orbit Insertion (SOI) burn maneuver coming up in July 2004. 
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Fortunately, the Prime Regulator leak problem was discovered several years before the SOI 
burn was to commence, thereby allowing sufficient time to evaluate the history behind this 
problem and discover the cause of the anomaly (an important ‘lessons learned’ for future 
spacecraft in their development phases) and determine a fix to the mission design. Cassini’s 
pre-launch Regulator design was based upon Galileo’s Teflon “soft-seat” configuration 
which had demonstrated very good performance in flight, exhibiting excellent leakage 
behavior. However, cold-flow tests indicated that this type of soft-seat design was likely to 
experience a blocked flow passage due to seat extrusion (potentially a mission catastrophic 
failure). Galileo’s test data was unavailable to evaluate this problem, so that Cassini’s soft-
seat was replaced with a “hard-seat” to avoid susceptibility to this failed-block condition, 
with a slight performance difference: the specified leak rate is increased by a factor of “10” 
with this hard-seat design: 
 
 
Table 2. Established Leak Specifications for Soft Seat & Hard Seat Regulator Designs. 
Enhancements were incorporated into Cassini’s PMS design due to this increased risk in 
leak rate. A redundant, backup regulator was installed, as well as two new ‘Over Pressure’ 
(OP) FP algorithms, which were designed to detect any tank over-pressurization within the 
fuel and oxidizer tanks, which was to be use for all non-critical ME burns (non-critical 
mission phases; i.e. not used during the critical SOI Burn event). The pre-launch mission 
design called for the PMS system to be characterized 30 days prior to the SOI Burn 
maneuver, so that the OP FP could be disabled. Leak mitigation measures were also added 
to the PMS plumbing: Two high-pressure helium latch valves (LV10 & LV11), a pyro-
isolation ladder upstream of the regulators (PV10-PV15), plus several filters as depicted in 
Figure 11 (Barber, 2002; Leeds et al., 1996): 
These design changes led to a heightened confidence which drove Cassini’s mission design 
and led to the implementation of two waivers for the critical SOI Burn; so that the OP FP 
algorithms were NOT required during the SOI maneuver: 
Waiver #1: Any “Under Pressure” condition is negligible  
Waiver #2: Any “Over Pressure” condition is extremely improbable 
Fixing the Problem: Cassini’s original flight strategy was to lock-up the prime regulator one 
month after launch, command the LV-10 helium latch valve open to feed helium into the 
tanks, and then leave LV-10 open for the remainder of the mission. With the leaky Prime 
Regulator in place, any pressurized ME burn had the potential to increase the leak rate. Since 
the Backup Regulator was also subject to a particulate-induced leak, swapping devices was 
deemed impractical unless the leak rate increased substantially on the Prime Regulator. 
Therefore, it was decided that LV10 must be opened just before to any ME pressurization 
activity, and must be closed as soon as the desired pressure levels were reached. Hence all 
ME burns had to be initiated via uplinked autonomous command sequences to ensure that 
the proper timing was maintained. This solution was not applicable to the SOI Burn which 
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was critical to the Cassini mission in that the spacecraft must be decelerated sufficiently in 
order to be captured into Saturn’s orbit (Morgan, 2010).  
 
  
Fig. 11. Cassini’s Propulsion System Schematic (ME Only). 
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Fig. 12. OP-1 & OP-2 Monitor and Response Configuration. 
 
 
Fig. 13. Insertion of the Cassini Spacecraft into the Saturnian System. 
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Since the PMS system could no longer be characterized and pressurized 30 days prior to the 
SOI Burn, the solution was to open LV-10 70sec before SOI Burn would commence, and 
close LV-10 when the desired tank pressure levels were reached. Identification of new 
failure modes associated with these changes in SOI Burn strategy were also necessary (e.g. 
helium LV-10 could become stuck closed, thus requiring an automated swap to the 
redundant helium LV-11 via FP; the Prime Regulator could fail wide-open or completely 
closed, thus requiring a swap to the redundant Backup Regulator), and these studies were 
conducted during the cruise phase of the mission before reaching Saturn.  
New/augmented FP changes were incorporated in FSW and uplinked prior to the SOI Burn 
event, as well as performing characterization studies of LV-10 leakage performance to 
ensure proper behavior (leak rate within spec). The SOI Burn commenced in July 2004 and 
was very successful with no faults present; regulator performance was also very good (no 
increase in leak rate or significant rise in tank pressure level). 
4.2 Galileo Mission-to-Jupiter spacecraft unexpected events 
4.2.1 Missed launch due to STS-51L Shuttle challenger explosion  
The Mission-to-Jupiter Galileo spacecraft was finally launched via Space Shuttle (STS-34) on 
October 18, 1989 after 11 years of development effort and 6 major mission redesigns. Once 
completed, Galileo was scheduled to launch onboard Shuttle Atlantis, STS-61G in 1986. The 
Centaur-G liquid hydrogen-fueled booster stage was to be utilized for a direct trajectory to 
Planet Jupiter. However, the mission was delayed by the interruption in launches that 
occurred following the STS-51L Shuttle Challenger disaster. Implemented were new safety 
protocols as a result of the tragedy which prohibited the use of the Centaur-G stage on 
Space Shuttle flights, forcing Galileo to use a lower-powered Inertial Upper Stage solid-fuel 
booster. During the down-time between 1986 and 1988 while the Space Shuttle Investigation 
was underway, the Galileo team evaluated alternative measures, since the low-powered  
 
Fig. 14. Galileo’s Launch. 
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Fig. 15. Galileo’s Mission Trajectory. 
booster option presented a crisis in that the energy required to achieve a direct trajectory to 
Jupiter would no longer be possible. The mission was re-profiled to use several gravitational 
slingshot maneuvers of the spacecraft by the solar system’s inner planets, so that a Venus-
Earth-Earth Gravity Assist (VEEGA) strategy was designed and implemented in order to 
provide the additional velocity required to reach its destination. Galileo flew by Venus on 
February 10, 1990 gaining 8,030 km/hr; flew by Earth twice, the first time on December 8, 
1990, then a second flyby of Earth on December 8, 1992, adding 3.7 km/sec to its cumulative 
speed. In 1994, Galileo was perfectly positioned to observe the fragments of Comet 
Shoemaker-Levy 9 crash into Jupiter. Galileo released its probe on July 13, 1995, and became 
the first man-made satellite on December 8, 1995 to enter Jupiter in a 198-day parking orbit. 
By the clever use of gravity assists from the inner planets Venus and Earth, a viable mission 
was possible, although required a much longer flight time to Jupiter. This extended journey 
required several design modifications which included adding several sun shields to protect 
the vehicle when flying by Venus. To ensure its systems would survive, Galileo also added 
operations modifications which included a delay in the deployment of the High Gain 
Antenna (HGA) until the spacecraft was past the first Earth flyby event. 
4.2.2 High gain antenna deployment failure 
Galileo’s HGA consisted of a metalized mesh fortified by a set of ribs (i.e. similar to an 
inverted umbrella), held to the support tower by a series of pins and retaining rods. These 
retaining rods were release shortly after launch but the HGA was maintained in a closed 
configuration that was thermally protected from the sun until the spacecraft was > 1 AU 
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away (after the first Earth flyby). The SOFS Team communicated with Galileo through its 
two Low Gain Antennas (LGA). When commanded to deploy on April 11, 1991, the HGA 
only partially deployed, leaving the HGA mission in jeopardy. An investigation team was 
organized to rectify the problem where numerous attempts were made to fully deploy the 
antenna over the next two years, while investigating the alternative of using the LGA to 
support the Jovian operations segment of the mission. All attempts to fully deploy the HGA 
were unsuccessful, leaving the HGA antenna nearly useless.  
In order to redesign the Galileo mission for LGA use only, the telecommunications link 
architecture was redesigned. The current architecture only supported 10 bps at Jupiter 
which was less than 1/10,000th of the 134 kilobits per second (Kbps) required. Since 
modifications to the spacecraft’s hardware to boost the transmit power was not possible, 
receiving capability of Earth’s ground stations and developing a more efficient data and 
telecommunications architecture was the primary focus of the needed upgrades. Arraying 
the DSN antennas increased the rate by a factor of 2.5, and modifications to the receivers 
and telecommunications link parameters, improving encoding and onboard data 
compression further increased the downlink from 10 bps to 4.5Kbps. Since these 
improvements were insufficient to bring down all science data objectives, the SOFS team 
negotiated with the science team to prioritize science goals, develop new science plans, and 
periodically update spacecraft FSW to increase data efficiency. Also, as a backup to the 
downlinked data, the onboard Data Memory Subsystem (DMS) tape recorder was utilized 
during selected high activity periods (Nilsen & Jansma, 2011). 
 
Fig. 16. Galileo’s Undeployed HGA. 
5. Contending with mission difficulties 
5.1 Mars exploration rover wheel failures   
The Mars Exploration Rover (MER) mission is an ongoing, scientific undertaking involving 
two golf cart-sized robotic rovers. This mission is part of NASA's Mars Exploration 
Program, which includes two previous Viking program landers (1976) and the Mars 
Pathfinder probe (1997). The six-wheeled MER robotic vehicles, Spirit and Opportunity, 
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landed in 2004 to explore the Martian surface and its geology. The mission’s primary 
objective is to search for and characterize a wide range of rocks and soils that hold clues to 
past water activity on Mars. Originally a three-month mission, the MER mission was 
extended to present day. To date, much evidence has been collected to indicate that Mars 
was once a wetter and warmer place than has previously been determined.  
 
Fig. 17. Mars Exploration Rover. 
 
Fig. 18. Rover Configuration - Deployed. 
During the mission, one of Spirit's six wheels stopped working. Its right-front wheel became 
a concern once before, when it began drawing unusually high current five months after the 
January 2004 landing. The SOFS team decided to drive Spirit backwards, which 
redistributed its lubricant and actually returned the wheel to normal operation. However, 
during the 779th Martian day, the motor that rotates that same wheel ceased working. One 
possibility considered by the SOFS team was that the motor's brushes or contacts that 
deliver power to the rotating part of the motor had lost contact. As a result of dragging 
Spirit’s right front wheel, it cut a furrow in the Martian soil, revealing the layer beneath the 
surface, and in doing so, unearthed a material which significantly changed our thinking 
about Mars. Spirit found the evidence for a hydrothermal system, not only proving the 
existence of liquid water on Mars, but that there were energy sources coincident with that of 
liquid water, revealing the potential for support of an ecosystem. 
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Rover Spirit became trapped in soft sand in 2009, and eventually ceased communicating 
with Earth in March 2010. Nearly seven years after launch, Rover Opportunity is still 
healthy, although the SOFS team has been driving this vehicle backward for the last two 
years in order to spread wear more evenly within its gear mechanisms (Callas, 2006).  
5.2 Voyager interstellar mission RTLT 
The Voyager Spacecraft Program consists of two scientific probes; Voyager 1 and Voyager 2. 
Both were launched in 1977 to take advantage of the favorable planetary alignment of the 
outer planets. Although officially designated to study just Jupiter and Saturn, the probes 
were able to continue their mission into the outer solar system, and as of June 2011, have 
exited the solar system and currently reside within the Heliosheath (region between the 
Termination Shock and the Heliopause). Voyager 1 is currently the farthest human-made 
object from Earth; as of July 2011: 
 
Fig. 19. Voyager Spacecraft. 
 
Table 3. Voyager Distance / RTLT from the Sun. 
On December 10, 2007, instruments onboard Voyager 2 sent data back to Earth indicating 
that the solar system is asymmetrical; the Heliopause remains an unknown distance ahead. 
The number of real-time commands must be kept to a minimum for spacecraft missions that 
must endure long RTLTs. For the Voyager spacecraft, the SOFS team performs commanding 
primarily by uplinked sequences containing several instructions. Since scheduled DSN 
antenna time coverage (~9hrs) is too short to wait for real-time verification of these 
commands, the team utilizes an alternative method to verify command success: the 
command sequence is transmitted by the DSN antenna (ground station) to that point in 
space where the spacecraft will be a OWLT (One Way Light Time) hence. For the Voyager 1 
in July 2011, this OWLT was approximately 16.2hrs, respectively; downlink telemetry is 
then transmitted from the spacecraft and received by the DSN antenna from the point in 
space where the spacecraft was OWLT ago (Medina, Sedlacko, & Angrum, 2010).  
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Fig. 20. Current Voyager Spacecraft Position. 
 
Fig. 21. Voyager 1 RTLT vs. Time. 
 
Fig. 22. Voyager 2 RTLT vs. Time. 
A total time allotment of 32hrs, 23min, and 55sec plus sequence execution time, FSW 
processing time, and command execution time is required in order to verify each command 
sequence (i.e. more than one DSN antenna pass coverage is required to uplink and verify 
every command/command sequence; see Figure 23).  
0.00
10.00
20.00
30.00
40.00
1
9
7
7
-…
1
9
7
9
-…
1
9
8
1
-…
1
9
8
3
-…
1
9
8
5
-…
1
9
8
7
-…
1
9
8
9
-…
1
9
9
1
-…
1
9
9
3
-…
1
9
9
5
-…
1
9
9
7
-…
1
9
9
9
-…
2
0
0
1
-…
2
0
0
3
-…
2
0
0
5
-…
2
0
0
7
-…
2
0
0
9
-…
2
0
1
1
-…
2
0
1
3
-…
2
0
1
5
-…
2
0
1
7
-…
2
0
1
9
-…
RTLT
(hours)
0.00
20.00
40.00
60.00
1
9
7
7
-…
1
9
7
9
-…
1
9
8
1
-…
1
9
8
3
-…
1
9
8
5
-…
1
9
8
7
-…
1
9
8
9
-…
1
9
9
1
-…
1
9
9
3
-…
1
9
9
5
-…
1
9
9
7
-…
1
9
9
9
-…
2
0
0
1
-…
2
0
0
3
-…
2
0
0
5
-…
2
0
0
7
-…
2
0
0
9
-…
2
0
1
1
-…
2
0
1
3
-…
2
0
1
5
-…
2
0
1
7
-…
2
0
1
9
-…
RTLT
(hours)
www.intechopen.com
 
Advances in Spacecraft Systems and Orbit Determination 262 
 
 
Fig. 23. Voyager DSN Strategy. 
SOFS teams managing missions with long RTLTs such as the Voyager spacecraft must 
minimize real-time commanding. When commands are sent, typically the team must verify 
these commands the following day (or two). To date, both Voyager spacecraft have 
adequate electrical power and propellant margin to maintain systems and attitude control 
until around 2025, at which time, science data return and spacecraft operations will cease.  
6. Lessons learned 
Although numerous precautionary measures are implemented into JPL robotic spacecraft 
missions to preclude faults and prevent failures, many unforeseen problems can occur 
throughout its journey. “Lessons learned” documentation captured from previously flown 
spacecraft can be of great help when designing future missions. For the most part, 
autonomous FP algorithms are based upon past flight experience, but new mission 
destinations can present challenges never before encountered by spacecraft.  
Overall, for spacecraft to function properly without significant risk or degradation to the 
mission and its objectives, autonomous FP must be implemented to ensure that detection 
and resolution of fault occurrences are dealt with properly so that the spacecraft may 
preserve its overall health and provide a system with adequate diagnostic capabilities. This 
effort requires that subsystems are characterized accurately. The approval of Cassini’s pre-
launch PMS regulator waivers is a good example of a mistake in ruling out the possibility of 
malfunction based upon surmised flight experience, without supporting test data (from 
Galileo) for adequate evaluation. Unfortunately, the enhancements to FSW and hardware 
boosted confidence in the upgraded design changes and drove Cassini’s FP design strategy 
as well as its mission profile, as its most critical maneuver relied solely upon the successful 
initiation of the 30-day Pre-SOI Burn Characterization Task. Yet even under these 
circumstances, FP modifications and additions were successfully designed and uplinked to 
the spacecraft to preserve the mission, it’s three tour phases, and safeguard its science data 
collection objectives since designers provided for the possibility of extra FP slots in FSW.  
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In any case, the experience gained though Cassini’s leaky regulator problem, and lessons 
learned in many other JPL spacecraft missions, has demonstrated that these types of 
unexpected failures can be resolved though re-evaluation and implementation of new 
FSW/FP in-flight; an endeavor which is possible during spacecraft missions if enough time 
is available. Flight experience has also taught us that the development of post-FP response 
recovery procedures which contain pre-defined actions for the SOFS team to follow greatly 
reduces post-fault recovery time and accuracy in diagnosing faults. New strategies such as 
the “planet-flyby gravitational slingshot” concept developed for the Galileo mission provide 
innovative ideas which may be utilized on upcoming spacecraft designs; in this case, for 
boosting the heavy, two-story sized Cassini vehicle into deep space, thereby reducing 
propellant requirements by as substantial margin. 
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